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In this paper, we apply supermodular game theory to the equilibrium search literature
with sequential search. We identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for strategic com-
plementarities and prove existence of search market equilibrium. When ﬁrms are identical,
the Diamond Paradox obtains and is robust within the class of search cost densities that
are small near zero and support strategic complementarities. Price dispersion is therefore
inherently incompatible with strategic complementarities. Finally, we show that a major
criticism of the literature, that agents act as if they know the distribution of prices, can
be justiﬁed in the sense of convergent best response dynamics.
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In this paper, we apply concepts and tools from the literature on supermodular games to
address three fundamental long-standing open questions in the equilibrium search literature
with sequential search. The ﬁrst is: what is the nature and source of observed price
dispersion, which has been extensively documented in real-world markets? According to
conventional wisdom, distilled from Rob’s (1985) seminal contribution, price dispersion
may be a purely informational phenomenon in the sense that it can arise solely from
imperfect information about market prices and heterogeneity in consumers’ search costs
under mild assumptions.
In this paper, we consider the general class of equilibrium search models with sequen-
tial search developed by Carlson and McAfee (1983) and B´ enabou (1993), with potential
bilateral heterogeneities in consumers’ search costs as well as ﬁrms’ production costs. An
important distinction between our model and that in Rob (1985) is that the latter takes
demand to be perfectly inelastic with inﬁnite willingness to pay, which rules out ex ante the
Diamond (1971) equilibrium where almost all ﬁrms charge the unique monopoly price. In
our model, we show that when ﬁrms are identical and a Rob-type condition applies to the
density of search costs at zero then the Diamond equilibrium is the unique search market
equilibrium and the Diamond Paradox is robust to heterogeneity in search costs within
the class of search cost distributions that generate strategic complementarities. Although
heterogeneous search costs may contribute to observed dispersion, they are not the source
of it, and dispersion is not a purely informational phenomenon under these conditions. We
then show that a simple Reinganum (1979)-type condition on production costs is suﬃcient
for all search market equilibria to exhibit dispersion. In that case, dispersion is driven at
least in part by technological conditions.1
Since its inception in the early 1960s, a major recurring criticism of the literature has
1 The above discussion is limited to equilibrium search models with sequential search. In models with
other search technologies, dispersion can obtain in equilibrium even though consumers and ﬁrms are ex ante
identical. See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) for a survey of the theoretical literature and empirical
evidence on price dispersion.
1been that consumers and ﬁrms act “as if” they know the distribution of prices. E.g.,
These results depend on the assumption that the searcher behaves as if he knows the
distribution of prices. In any economic context, this is a very bad assumption. Little is known
about the nature of price distributions, and it seems absurd to suppose that consumers know
them with any degree of accuracy.
Rothschild (1974)
and
Perhaps the most restrictive and least palatable assumption of the elementary search
model is the supposition that the oﬀer distribution F is known.
Lippman and McCall (1981).
Although this criticism is valid for any static game-theoretic equilibrium concept, it applies
with particular force to this literature, whose explicit aim after all is to characterize markets
with informational imperfections. Moreover, it seems clear that real-world consumers (and
ﬁrms) do not have anything close to the required information.
To address this issue, B´ enabou and Gertner (1993) and Dana (1994) develop equilib-
rium search models where ﬁrms have private information about their costs and consumers,
who know the distribution of production costs as well as ﬁrms’ pricing strategies, learn
about the distribution of prices as they search. Although this approach generates impor-
tant insights (e.g., about the relationship between dispersion and unanticipated inﬂation),
these informational requirements are clearly very strong. Another approach is that of Rauh
(1997), where agents only know ﬁnitely many moments of the distribution of prices. Al-
though this is weaker than knowing the entire distribution (all inﬁnitely many moments),
it is still not clear how agents obtain this information, which is contemporaneous.
In this paper, we pursue a dynamic approach to this issue. In particular, we show
that “as if” knowledge of last period’s distribution of prices can be suﬃcient in the sense of
convergent best response dynamics, where consumers’ reservation levels and ﬁrms’ proﬁt-
maximizing prices are best responses against the distribution of prices which prevailed in
the previous period. This result is dramatically diﬀerent from that in Hopkins and Seymour
(2002), who model price dispersion as mixed-strategy equilibria (in our model, equilibrium
is always in pure strategies) and show that such equilibria are generally unstable in the
2class of models they examine. In our case, we can therefore interpret static search market
equilibrium, where agents act as if they know the distribution of prices, as a long-run
steady-state which can be arbitrarily closely approximated by a sequence of short-run
“equilibria” in which agents behave as if they know last period’s distribution of prices, and
whose ignorance vanishes in the limit.
The ﬁnal issue concerns existence. In this literature, the pricing game involves a
continuum of ﬁrms whose proﬁts depend on their own prices as well as the distribution
of prices in the market. Unfortunately, little seems to be known about games with this
structure, so existence is a nontrivial problem. The main methodological innovation of
the paper is our use of concepts and tools from the literature on supermodular games,
including Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Topkis (1979, 1998), and Vives (1990, 1999).
We ﬁrst derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the pricing game to exhibit
strategic complementarities, which restrict how negative the slope of the density of search
costs can be. In particular, a simple suﬃcient condition is that the density of search costs
be at least weakly increasing over an initial segment of its domain. As explained below, this
essentially implies that consumers have relatively high search costs, which seems consistent
with recent empirical work by Hong and Shum (2006). It is also consistent with the
following assessment of the relevant marketing literature
External information search is skewed toward limited search, with the greatest proportion
of consumers performing little external search immediately prior to purchase. Surveys of
shopping behavior have shown a signiﬁcant percent of all durable purchases are made after
visiting only one store... Measures of the use of personal and nonmarket sources also show
somewhat limited levels of search... Based on six separate studies that span more than
30 years, two product categories, four services, and two countries... approximately half of
the purchases are preceded by virtually no external information search; about one-third are
associated with limited information search; and only 12 percent involve extensive information
seeking prior to purchase.
Hawkins, Best, and Coney (1995, p. 451)
Although games with a continuum of players whose payoﬀs depend on the distribution
of actions have not been analyzed in the literature on supermodular games, we show that
several of the main results extend to equilibrium search models. In particular, when
the game exhibits strategic complementarities, the existence question is easily resolved. In
fact, we show that there exists a largest (high-price) and smallest (low-price) pure-strategy
3Nash equilibrium, as in standard supermodular games. Moreover, existence is more than
a theoretical curiosity, since we use it to prove our results on price dispersion: when ﬁrms
are identical, the aforementioned extremal equilibria are symmetric (degenerate) and the
Rob-type condition mentioned earlier then implies a unique symmetric equilibrium. It
follows that the unique search market equilibrium is the Diamond equilibrium. A basic
insight of the paper, therefore, is that price dispersion is inherently incompatible with
strategic complementarities, where strategic variables tend to be set at comparable levels,
whereas dispersion requires that some ﬁrms set high prices and others low ones.
If the pricing game exhibits strict strategic complementarities, we can also apply
standard results from supermodular game theory on the stability of the best response
dynamics, suitably adapted to the present context. Speciﬁcally, from any initial condition
the best response dynamics approach the interval of strategy proﬁles determined by the
smallest and largest equilibria, so a unique equilibrium is globally stable. An important
special case is when the Diamond Paradox obtains and the unique Diamond equilibrium is
globally stable as originally discovered by Diamond (1971). The literature on supermodular
games is therefore utilized in a crucial way in proving all three main results of the paper
on existence, price dispersion, and dynamics.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we develop the model
and characterize some of its essential features. In section 3, we derive conditions such that
the pricing game exhibits strategic complementarities and establish the existence of search
market equilibrium. We study price dispersion in section 4 and the stability of the best
response dynamics in section 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs not in the text are in the
appendix.
2. The Model
The model is similar to those in Reinganum (1979), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Rob
(1985), B´ enabou (1993), and Rauh (2006). Let I = [0,L] be the set of ﬁrms, [0,M] the
set of consumers, and θ = M/L the buyer-seller ratio, where L,M > 0. Let C = [0,c] be
the set of feasible constant marginal costs and m(i) ∈ C be the marginal cost of ﬁrm i.2
2 All exogenously given functions such as m : I → C are assumed to be at least measurable.
4Except for their costs, ﬁrms are otherwise identical. Let m = supi m(i).
We assume all consumers have the same indirect utility function U(p,y) = v(p) + y,
where p is price and y is income. Let P = [0,p] be the set of prices consumers are willing
to pay, where c < p < ∞. Assume v is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on P (one-sided
derivatives at the endpoints). The demand curve is therefore x(p) = −v0(p), which is
continuous on P.
Assumptions 1. (i) x > 0 on [0,p) and x = 0 on (p,∞). (ii) x is decreasing on P.3 (iii)
For each c ∈ C, the monopoly problem
max
p∈[c,p]
πM(p,c) = (p − c)x(p) (1)
has a unique solution pM(c) ∈ (c,p] and πM
p ≡ ∂πM/∂p > 0 on [c,pM(c)).
These assumptions are general enough to cover most of the cases considered in the
literature. For example, a common assumption is that demand is inelastic at one unit up
to some maximum willingness to pay p, so x = 1 on P. In that case, pM(c) = p for all c
and πM
p = 1 on P. The assumptions also hold when demand is downward-sloping, twice
diﬀerentiable on P, and not too convex, so that πM is strictly concave. An example is
linear demand x(p) = a − bp, where a,b > 0 and ¯ p = a/b. It is easy to show that pM(c) is
increasing in c.
In this context, a strategy proﬁle is a (measurable) function f from ﬁrms I to prices P.
Since no ﬁrm prices below its marginal cost or above its monopoly price, let P be the set
of all strategy proﬁles such that m(i) ≤ f(i) ≤ pM(m(i)) and D the set of all cumulative
distribution functions (cdfs) induced by elements in P. Furthermore, let Fm be the cdf of
marginal costs (the cdf of prices induced by marginal cost pricing).
We make the standard assumptions that consumers search sequentially with recall
and the ﬁrst price quote is free.4 Let r be the lowest price the consumer has observed so
3 A function is increasing if x > x0 implies f(x) ≥ f(x0) and strictly increasing when the latter
inequality is strict. We deﬁne decreasing and strictly decreasing similarly.
4 The latter assumption has been relaxed in some recent papers; see Janssen and Moraga-Gonz´ alez
(2004), Rauh (2004), and Janssen, Moraga-Gonz´ alez, and Wildenbeest (2005). In this paper, we assume
the ﬁrst price quote is free to avoid the necessity of keeping track of those consumers who may potentially
drop out of the market.





[see B´ enabou (1993)]. Let R and R+ denote the sets of real numbers and nonnegative real
numbers, respectively. Proposition 1 below establishes some useful properties of Γ and
introduces the parameter ˜ s.
Proposition 1. For all F ∈ D: (i) Γ is absolutely continuous on P with derivative
x(p)F(p) almost everywhere. (ii) If
z(F) = sup{p ∈ R|F(p) = 0} ≥ 0 (3)
then Γ = 0 on the interval [0,z(F)], Γ > 0 on (z(F),p], and strictly increasing on [z(F),p].





Proposition 1(ii) concerns the basic shape of Γ, illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 Goes Here
Note that Γ is zero between 0 and z(F) and is positive and strictly increasing thereafter.
We now use the above result to deﬁne consumers’ reservation levels and explain the
signiﬁcance of ˜ s. First of all, a consumer with search cost s stops searching at all prices
r such that the marginal beneﬁt Γ(r,F) of another search is less than or equal to the
marginal cost s, so her reservation level is
r(s,F) = sup{r ∈ P |Γ(r,F) ≤ s}. (5)
In Figure 1, we see that the reservation level of the consumer with search cost s1 is r1.
Furthermore, the smallest possible reservation level is z(F), which is the reservation level
of the consumer with zero search cost (if any). All consumers with search costs s ≥ Γ(p,F)
have reservation level p. Note that for each consumer, her reservation level exists and is
unique since Γ is continuous and strictly increasing on [z(F),p].
6A consumer whose reservation level is greater than or equal to almost all market
prices searches exactly once with probability 1 and is therefore called an inactive searcher.
Since consumers with reservation levels r ≥ pM(m) are inactive searchers with search
costs s ≥ Γ(pM(m),F), the proportion of inactive searchers is bounded from below by
1 − Q(Γ(pM(m),F)), where Q is the cdf of consumers’ search costs. According to the
quotation in the introduction, the proportion of inactive searchers is often large in real-
world markets. From (iii), Γ(pM(m),F) ≤ ˜ s for all F ∈ D, so consumers with search costs
s ≥ ˜ s are always inactive searchers.
Assume Q can be represented by a probability density function (pdf) q with support
S = [0,s], where 0 < s ≤ ∞. Note that s can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite, so Assumptions 2 below
are extremely mild.
Assumptions 2. (i) q(s) > 0 on (0,s) and zero outside. (ii) q is bounded and continuous
on (0,s).
Note that we allow q to have potential discontinuities at s = 0 and s = s to accom-
modate the uniform distribution.





Q(Γ(r,F)) 0 ≤ r < p
1 r ≥ p,
(6)
with potential atom at p of size 1 − Q(Γ(p,F)). Using Proposition 1, we can represent G
on [0,p) by a density g deﬁned almost everywhere by
g(r|F) = G0(r|F) = Q0(Γ(r,F))x(r)F(r) = q(Γ(r,F))x(r)F(r). (7)
All ﬁrms face the same demand function, informally derived as follows. If ﬁrm i charges
the price p, its potential customers have reservation levels p ≤ r(s,F) ≤ p. Consumers
with reservation level p are inactive searchers and are randomly and evenly distributed
across all ﬁrms, so i expects to sell
M[1 − Q(Γ(p,F))]
L
x(p) = θx(p)[1 − Q(Γ(p,F))] (8)
7to them. Let Mg(r|F)dr be the mass of a consumer with reservation level r such that
p ≤ r < p. Firm i competes for this consumer with all ﬁrms pricing less than or equal to








Substituting from (7), we get
θx(p)q(Γ(r,F))x(r)dr. (10)
Summing over all consumers p ≤ r < p and adding the potential atom at p, the demand
function is





q(Γ(r,F))x(r)dr + 1 − Q(Γ(p,F)) (12)
is the “number” of customers.
Proposition 2. Demand D and the number of customers N are continuous and decreasing
on P for all F ∈ D. Moreover, N is diﬀerentiable on P except at most two points, with
derivative −q(Γ(p,F))x(p).
From (11) it is clear that θ has no qualitative eﬀect on our results, so from now on we
set θ = 1 for simplicity. Let Pc = (c,pM(c)]. Firms’ proﬁts are deﬁned by
π(p,c,F) = (p − c)D(p,F) = πM(p,c)N(p,F) (13)




We now deﬁne the usual Nash equilibrium concept in this context.
5 Since π is continuous, it has a maximizer on [c,pM(c)]. Since p = c results in zero proﬁts, pM(c) does
at least as well and we can restrict attention to Pc.
8Deﬁnitions 1. (i) A sequential search market is deﬁned by (m,q,v) satisfying Assump-
tions 1 and 2. (ii) A search market equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle f in P such that for
all i ∈ I,
π(f(i),m(i),Ff) ≥ π(p,m(i),Ff) (15)
for all p ∈ P, where Ff ∈ D is induced by f.
Note that search market equilibria are deﬁned for pure strategies only: we ignore mixed
strategies throughout the paper. As Echenique and Edlin (2004) have shown, properly
mixed strategy equilibria tend to be unstable in games with strategic complementarities,
so there may be good reasons for doing so. Also note that optimal sequential search by
consumers is incorporated into the demand function (11) by construction, so we do not
explicitly mention it in the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium.
3. Strategic Complementarities
From a game-theoretic perspective, the above equilibrium concept is somewhat unusual,
since players’ payoﬀs π(p,m(i),F) depend on the cdf F of players’ actions, as opposed
to direct dependence on the strategy proﬁle f itself. The existence issue is therefore a
nontrivial one and we begin this section with a brief discussion of previous results.
In Reinganum (1979), consumers are completely identical with the same search cost
and downward-sloping demand function and ﬁrms diﬀer with respect to their production
costs. Existence is not really an issue, since the equilibrium cdf of prices is directly induced
by the cdf of ﬁrms’ production costs. Rob (1985) considers the opposite polar case where
ﬁrms are identical and consumers have perfectly inelastic demand (p = ∞) and diﬀer
with respect to their search costs. Although his existence proof is ingenious, it does not
take into account potentially downward-sloping demand and does not extend to the case of
heterogeneous production costs. Carlson and McAfee (1983) also assume perfectly inelastic
demand, but allow for bilateral heterogeneity in production and search costs, and provide
an explicit solution for the equilibrium cdf of prices in the special case where the pdf of
search costs is uniform. B´ enabou (1990, 1993) generalizes Carlson and McAfee (1983)
9to allow for downward-sloping demand and a broad class of search cost densities, but is
unable to prove existence for reasons discussed in B´ enabou (1990).
In Rauh (1997), consumers have a belief about the cdf of prices based on a forecast
of ﬁnitely many of its moments. In equilibrium, consumers’ forecasts about moments are
correct, but their beliefs need not be. In this case, existence follows from the abstract game-
theoretic result in Rauh (2003) [also see the extension in Yu and Zhu (2005)]. Finally, Rauh
(2006) uses nonstandard analysis to prove existence in a general model with heterogeneities
in consumers’ demand functions, search costs, and ﬁrms’ cost functions, for a broad class
of demand and cost functions. Existence then follows from the abstract game-theoretic
result in Khan and Sun (1999). Although this approach yields existence under very general
conditions, it sheds little light on the structure of the equilibrium set, price dispersion, or
dynamic stability properties.
In this paper, we study the subclass of equilibrium sequential search models with
strategic complementarities. We deﬁne a binary relation on D as follows: F ≥ F0 if
F(p) ≤ F0(p) for all p ∈ P (F stochastically dominates F0.) Under this relation, D is
clearly a lattice.6 We write F > F0 if F ≥ F0 and F 6= F0. We ﬁrst investigate strategic
complementarities in the form of increasing diﬀerences in logπ.7 Recall that solutions
to a maximization problem are invariant to monotonic transformations of the objective
function.
Deﬁnition 2. A search market is (strictly) log-supermodular if logπ(p,m(i),F) is well-
deﬁned and has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences on Pm(i) × D for all i.
Proposition 3 below provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for (strict) log-
supermodularity. Let m = infi m(i).
Proposition 3. If Q(˜ s) < 1 then the search market is (strictly) log-supermodular iﬀ the
ratio q(Γ(p,F))/N(p,F) is (strictly) decreasing on D for all m ≤ p ≤ pM(m).
6 Recall that a partially ordered set is a set X and a binary relation ≥ on X which is reﬂexive, transitive,
and antisymmetric. A lattice (X,≥) is a partially ordered set such that inf{x,x0} and sup{x,x0} exist in
X for all x,x0 ∈ X. A lattice X is complete if supS and inf S exist in X for all nonempty S ⊆ X.
7 Let X and Y be partially ordered sets. A function f : X×Y → R has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences
on X × Y if f(x,y) − f(x,y0) is (strictly) increasing in x for all y ≥ y0 (y > y0).
10The condition Q(˜ s) < 1 guarantees positive proﬁts, so the (natural) logarithm of the
latter is well-deﬁned (see the proof).
The intuition for the result is as follows. Informally, the pricing game exhibits strategic
complementarities when price increases by a ﬁrm’s competitors induce the ﬁrm to raise
its own price (see Proposition 5 below). Now, suppose ﬁrm i is charging the price p when
a subset of its competitors raises their prices F > F0, increasing the number of ﬁrm i’s
customers N(p,F) > N(p,F0). According to Proposition 3, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for log-supermodularity is that q(Γ(p,F)) does not increase too much. Since
Γ(p,F) is clearly decreasing in F, this implies q cannot have an overly negative slope.
Why? If it did, there would be a relatively large mass of consumers with lower search costs
whose reservation levels are too low to buy from ﬁrm i. The increase in the cdf of prices
(in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) raises their reservation levels, so that a
sizable mass of consumers who formerly had a reservation level slightly below p would now
have reservation level p. This would discourage ﬁrm i from raising its price, because it
would then lose this large new mass of customers.
We now consider strategic complementarities in the form of increasing diﬀerences in
π.
Deﬁnition 3. A sequential search market is (strictly) supermodular if π(p,m(i),F) has
(strictly) increasing diﬀerences on Pm(i) × D for all i.
Let F ≥ F0 and deﬁne
∆N(p,F,F0) = N(p,F) − N(p,F0), (16)
the change in the number of customers when F0 increases to F at some given price p. A
necessary and suﬃcient condition for (strict) supermodularity is that
π(p,m(i),F) − π(p,m(i),F0) = πM(p,m(i))∆N(p,F,F0) (17)
be (strictly) increasing on Pm(i). Using Proposition 2 to diﬀerentiate (17) with respect to




∆q = q(Γ(p,F)) − q(Γ(p,F0)). (19)
Since πM > 0, we can re-arrange (18) to obtain (i) of Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4. (i) The search market is (strictly) supermodular iﬀ
πM
p
πM ∆N ≥ (>) x∆q (20)
on Pm(i) for all i and for all F ≥ F0. (ii) In particular, if q is at least weakly increasing on
[0, ˜ s] then the game is supermodular. If q is strictly increasing on that interval, the game
is strictly supermodular.
Condition (20) is similar to but diﬀerent from that in Proposition 3, since (20) involves
monopoly proﬁts. If p < p then x > 0 and we can re-write (20) as
πM
p
xπM ∆N ≥ (>) ∆q. (21)
Since πM
p > 0, ∆q cannot be too large, so once again q cannot have an overly negative
slope. The severity of this restriction compared to that in Proposition 3 depends on the
size of the monopoly proﬁt term multiplying ∆N.
Although the conditions in Proposition 3 and (20) are intuitive, they seem extremely
diﬃcult to check. In contrast, the condition in Proposition 4(ii) is readily ascertained
given any q. We ﬁrst note that the uniform density is constant on its support (hence
weakly increasing), so the game is supermodular in that case. It is important to recognize,
however, that (ii) only requires q to be increasing on [0, ˜ s] and not on its entire domain. In
particular, any density which is initially increasing and then decreasing, with ˜ s less than
the maximizer (mode) satisﬁes the condition. In that sense, (ii) is more of a condition on
˜ s than on q itself.
Recall that consumers with search costs s ≥ ˜ s are always inactive searchers. The
parameter ˜ s therefore provides an upper bound for the search cost, conditional on F,
which divides consumers into active and inactive searchers. If q has a standard hill- or
bell-shape and is symmetric (not required for the Proposition), then (ii) requires that ˜ s
12be less than the median search cost: the proportion of inactive searchers must be at least
half the market, which is roughly consistent with the quotation in the introduction.
We now turn to individual ﬁrm comparative statics. We deﬁne a binary relation on P
as follows: f ≥ f0 if f(p) ≥ f0(p) for all p ∈ P. In the appendix, we show that P with this
relation is a complete lattice (see Theorem A). Let φ be the best response correspondence
deﬁned by
φ(i,f) = arg max
p∈Pm(i)
π(p,m(i),Ff). (22)
Given log-supermodularity or supermodularity, the proofs of the next two results are fairly
standard.
Proposition 5. If the game is either log-supermodular or supermodular then for each
strategy proﬁle f, the image φ(i,f) ⊆ Pm(i) of the best response correspondence is
nonempty and compact, with largest φ(i,f) and smallest φ(i,f) elements, both measurable
on I and increasing on P.
If best responses are always unique, it follows that each ﬁrm responds to price increases
by its competitors by increasing its own price. Otherwise, we obtain weak monotone
comparative statics in the sense that the extremal best responses increase, resulting in an
upward shift in the set of best responses.
From now on, we say that the game exhibits (strict) strategic complementarities if
the search market is either (strictly) log-supermodular or supermodular. Although the
following result appears purely technical, it will play a crucial role in our analysis of price
dispersion.
Theorem 1. If the sequential search market exhibits strategic complementarities then
the equilibrium set is nonempty and has a largest f and smallest f element.
4. Price Dispersion
Price dispersion is ubiquitous; it has been observed everywhere from the modern Internet
[Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006)] to the Turkish bazaar [Caglayan, Filiztekin, and Rauh
(2006)]. It is the raison d’etre for the equilibrium search literature.
13Recall that the Diamond equilibrium is where almost all ﬁrms charge the unique





exists and is suﬃciently small.8 As such, it represents a slight extension of the literature
to the case of downward-sloping demand and heterogeneous production costs. Note that
the result does not rely on strategic complementarities. Let Fp0 denote the cdf of prices
that assigns probability 1 to some p0 ≥ 0.
Lemma 1. Assume q(0+) exists. (i) If demand x is perfectly inelastic at one unit on P
and q(0+) < 1/p then Fp is the unique symmetric equilibrium. (ii) If ﬁrms are identical





for all c < p < pM(c) then FpM(c) is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
In (i), the Diamond equilibrium obtains no matter how heterogeneous production and
search costs are. In (ii), it obtains when demand is properly downward-sloping and no
matter how heterogeneous search costs are. In both cases, there are no more symmetric
equilibria, although we have yet to rule out dispersed (asymmetric) equilibria.
The intuition for uniqueness is as follows. Consider case (ii) and suppose almost all
ﬁrms are charging p0, where c < p0 < pM(c). If a ﬁrm were to raise its price above
p0, its monopoly proﬁts would increase [see Assumptions 1 and (13)] but it would lose
its customers with low search costs. When q(0+) is relatively small, the former eﬀect
dominates and Fp0 cannot be an equilibrium. The result therefore conﬁrms and extends
the conventional wisdom about the importance of the behavior of the density of search
costs near zero.
We now come to the main result of this section.
8 Recall that q may have a discontinuity at zero (e.g., the uniform distribution) so q(0+) can be diﬀerent
from q(0).
14Theorem 2. If the search market exhibits strategic complementarities, ﬁrms are identical,
and q(0+) is suﬃciently small in the sense of Lemma 1, then the Diamond Paradox obtains:
the Diamond equilibria in Lemma 1 are the unique search market equilibria overall for their
respective cases.
Proof.
Consider case (i) or (ii) in Lemma 1. According to that lemma, the Diamond equilibrium
is the unique symmetric equilibrium. By Theorem 1, the set of search market equilibria
has a largest f and smallest f element. In the case of f, the equilibrium involves ﬁrms
making their largest best response f(i) against f (see the proof of Theorem 1). Since ﬁrms
are identical, their largest best response is the same, and f is a symmetric equilibrium.
Since f is also a symmetric equilibrium, f = f and equilibrium is unique: the unique
equilibrium is the Diamond equilibrium.
This result illustrates the power of the theory of supermodular games for the study of
price dispersion. Given the existing literature, lemma 1 is not that surprising: when ﬁrms
are identical and a Rob (1985)-type condition on q(0+) holds, the Diamond equilibrium
is the unique single-price equilibrium. What is surprising is the eﬀect of combining that
result with strategic complementarities: in that case, the Diamond equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium overall, and no amount of heterogeneity in search costs can overcome
the Diamond Paradox.
It follows that to induce dispersion, we need some other source of heterogeneity. The
following result shows that a simple Reinganum-type condition is suﬃcient for all equilibria
to be dispersed (existence is assured by Theorem 1). Note that this condition rules out
perfectly inelastic demand since we have assumed c < p.
Lemma 2. Let IR be the set of all i such that there exists I0 ⊆ I of positive measure
such that pM(m(i)) < m(i0) for all i0 ∈ I0. If IR has positive measure then degenerate
equilibria do not exist.
In this case, dispersion is not a purely informational phenomenon but is instead driven
15by imperfect information, downward-sloping demand, and heterogeneous production costs.
As such, it is at least in part a technological phenomenon.
We now compare the above results with Rob (1985), where ﬁrms are all identical
and consumers have perfectly inelastic demand and diﬀer with respect to their search
costs. First of all, the assumption that consumers have inﬁnite willingness to pay (p = ∞)
eliminates the Diamond equilibrium ex ante. Without it, other single-price equilibria do





for at least one s > 0 [Rob (1985, theorem 1)]. Assuming the latter, the existence of price
dispersion boils down to plain existence, which is again guaranteed under mild conditions
[Rob (1985, lemma 4 and Theorem 2)]. The bottom line is that dispersion obtains under
mild assumptions and is robust in that sense.
In contrast, when demand is inelastic with ﬁnite willingness to pay or is downward-
sloping, the above methodology breaks down. Once the Diamond equilibrium is in the
equilibrium set, existence is no longer an issue and the existence of price dispersion no
longer equivalent to plain existence. Moreover, the Diamond Paradox obtains over a robust
and natural region of model-space: the subset of equilibrium search models with strategic
complementarities.
5. Dynamics
In equilibrium, consumers and ﬁrms act as if they know the cdf of prices, which requires
a substantial amount of information and computational power. First of all, the model
(m,q,v) must be common knowledge: agents must know consumers’ search costs, consumer
demand x, and ﬁrms’ production costs. Furthermore, agents must be able to actually
compute the equilibrium cdf of prices, something the theoretical literature itself has been
unable to do except in certain special cases [see Carlson and McAfee (1983)].
In this paper, we assume agents are myopic and have enough information to re-create
the cdf of prices which prevailed in the previous period. Although real-world agents may
not even possess this information, these assumptions are nevertheless orders of magnitude
16weaker than those above. Given last period’s cdf of prices, consumers can calculate their
reservation levels knowing only their own demand and search cost. To compute their proﬁt-
maximizing prices, ﬁrms still need to know consumers’ demand and search costs, but they
need not know other ﬁrms’ costs or be able to compute the equilibrium cdf of prices. We
assume given some initial condition; the uniform distribution is a natural choice.
A best response orbit is therefore a sequence {fn} of strategy proﬁles such that
fn+1(i) ∈ φ(i,fn) for all i ∈ I and n ≥ 0 for some initial condition f0 ∈ P. In other
words, consumers’ reservation levels and ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximizing prices are best responses
against last period’s cdf of prices.9 Given two strategy proﬁles a and b, we can deﬁne an
interval in P as follows:
[a,b] = {f ∈ P |a ≤ f ≤ b}. (26)
We say that a sequence {fn} of strategy proﬁles approaches [a,b] if there exist two sequences
{f
n} and {fn} of strategy proﬁles such that f
n ≤ fn ≤ fn for all n ≥ 0 and f
n ↑ a and
fn ↓ b almost uniformly.10 In other words, {fn} is being “squeezed” towards [a,b] from
above and below by two sequences in P converging monotonically and almost uniformly
to its endpoints. Let
P+ = {f ∈ P |f ≥ Ψ(f)}
P− = {f ∈ P |f ≤ Ψ(f)}, (27)
where Ψ : P → P is deﬁned by f 7→ φ(i,f) and similarly for Ψ.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) have shown that supermodular games
with ﬁnitely many players have nice stability properties. Theorem 3 below shows that, to
some extent, this extends to equilibrium search models with a continuum of ﬁrms. Given
the above deﬁnitions, the proof involves minor adaptations of the argument for theorem
5.1 in Vives (1990, p. 313) to account for the inﬁnite-dimensional and measure-theoretic
aspects of the current context.
9 Recall that optimal sequential search is built into ﬁrms’ demand function; see (2) and (12). Moreover,
fn enters φ(i,fn) through the induced cdf Ffn of prices; see (22). The notation is therefore slightly
misleading, since it suggests that agents act as if they know fn, when in fact they act as if they know Ffn.
10 Let f and fn for all n ≥ 1 be measurable functions I → R and λ denote Lebesgue measure on R.
We say that fn → f almost uniformly if for all  > 0 there exists I0 ⊆ I such that λ(I0) <  and fn → f
uniformly on the complement of I0 in I. See Folland (1999, p. 60). We write fn ↑ f if fn ≤ fn+1 for all
n ≥ 1 and fn → f almost uniformly. The deﬁnition for fn ↓ f is similar.
17Theorem 3. Assume strict strategic complementarities and that if the cdf of prices is the
same in periods n and n + 1 then ﬁrms set the same prices at n + 2 as they did in n + 1.
(i) Every best response orbit approaches [f,f], where f is the smallest search market
equilibrium and f is the largest.
(ii) For any best response orbit {fn} with initial condition in P+ (P−), there exists a
search market equilibrium f ∈ E such that fn ↓ f (fn ↑ f).
(iii) If equilibrium is unique, then every best response orbit approaches it.
According to (i), all best response orbits approach the interval [f,f] in P deﬁned by
the smallest and largest equilibria. It follows that if the best response dynamics exhibit
any regularities (limiting behaviors such as convergence to a ﬁxed point or periodic cycle),
then such regularities will either be in [f,f] or arbitrarily close. In (ii), we show that best
response dynamics starting from initial conditions in P+ or P− converge to search market
equilibria. In particular, in the proof we show that the best response orbit starting from
monopolistic expectations pM(m(i)) ∈ P+ converges to f and that starting from perfectly
competitive expectations m(i) ∈ P− converges to f, so the result is not vacuous. In the
long-run, agents act as if they know the equilibrium cdf of prices and such behavior can
be approximated arbitrarily closely by short-run “equilibria” where consumers’ reservation
levels and ﬁrms’ prices are best responses against last period’s distribution of prices. In (iii),
we have the strong result that a unique equilibrium is approached from all initial conditions
(global stability), where “approach” is a strong form of convergence involving monotonic
almost uniform squeezing from above and below. In particular, when the Diamond Paradox
obtains, the Diamond equilibrium is globally stable as discovered by Diamond (1971).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we applied concepts and tools from the theory of supermodular games
to the equilibrium search literature with sequential search. We considered the class of
equilibrium search models in Carlson and McAfee (1983) and B´ enabou (1993) with bilat-
eral heterogeneities in consumers’ search costs and ﬁrms’ production costs and potentially
downward-sloping demand with ﬁnite willingness to pay. We identiﬁed necessary and
18suﬃcient conditions for the pricing game to exhibit strategic complementarities, which
essentially restrict how negative the slope of the density of search costs can be. In partic-
ular, a suﬃcient condition is that the density be at least weakly increasing over an initial
segment of its domain. This implies consumers have relatively high search costs, which
seems consistent with empirical evidence.
Given strategic complementarities, we proved the existence of search market equilib-
rium. Indeed, there exists a largest and smallest equilibrium as in standard supermodular
games. We then showed that the Diamond Paradox obtains when ﬁrms are identical, a Rob
(1985)-type condition holds with respect to the behavior of the density of search costs near
zero, and the pricing game exhibits strategic complementarities. According to conventional
wisdom, distilled from the seminal Rob (1985) paper where demand is perfectly inelastic
with inﬁnite willingness to pay, price dispersion can arise solely from imperfect informa-
tion and heterogeneous search costs under mild assumptions. In contrast, in our model
the Diamond Paradox is immune to the distribution of search costs within the class that
generates strategic complementarities. A basic insight of the paper is that price disper-
sion is therefore inherently incompatible with strategic complementarities, where strategic
variables tend to be set at comparable levels. On the other hand, a simple Reinganum
(1979)-type condition on ﬁrms’ production costs ensures that all equilibria are dispersed.
Finally, we show that a major criticism of the literature, that agents act as if they know the
distribution of prices, can be justiﬁed in the sense of convergent best response dynamics.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst note that Γ : P × D → R+ deﬁned in (2) is well-deﬁned since the integrand is
measurable and dominated by an integrable function: 0 ≤ x(p)F(p) ≤ x(p). (i) follows
from theorem 5.5 and proposition 6.5 in Haaser and Sullivan (1991, p. 237, 240). (ii) is
obvious. Since F ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Fm for all F ∈ D,







x(p)Fm(p)dp ≡ ˜ s (A.1)
for all 0 ≤ r ≤ pM(m), so (iii) follows.
Before proving Proposition 2, we brieﬂy return to (7). This reveals the form of the pdf
g for G on [0,p), but we have not shown that G is absolutely continuous on that interval.
The latter follows easily from the assumption that Q is absolutely continuous and Γ(r,F)
is increasing and absolutely continuous by Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the product of a bounded measurable function and an integrable function is
integrable. Now, q(Γ(r,F)) is bounded and continuous in r except possibly at r = z(F)
and at the point where Γ = s if s is ﬁnite. It follows that q(Γ(r,F)) is bounded measurable.
Since x(r) is integrable, the integral in (12) is well-deﬁned. The rest follows from theorem
5.5 and proposition 6.5 in Haaser and Sullivan (1991, p. 237, 240).
Proof of Proposition 3
Since Q(˜ s) < 1, the proportion of inactive searchers is positive for all F ∈ D. Since these
consumers are spread evenly across all ﬁrms, N(p,F) is positive for all F ∈ D. Moreover,
πM is positive on Pm(i), so π is positive and the logarithm in the statement of the result
is well-deﬁned. Let F > F0 in D. We must show that
logπ(p,m(i),F) − logπ(p,m(i),F0) = logN(p,F) − logN(p,F0) (A.2)
is (strictly) increasing on Pm(i). By Proposition 2, we can diﬀerentiate (A.2) except at















20This must hold for all p ∈ Pm(i) and all i, so it must hold on [m,pM(m)].
Proof of Proposition 4
We prove (ii). Since πM is strictly increasing on Pm(i), from (17) it is suﬃcient to prove
that ∆N(p,F,F0) is increasing. The latter holds iﬀ
Z p
p
[q(Γ(r,F)) − q(Γ(r,F0))]x(r)dr (A.5)
is increasing. This requires
q(Γ(p,F)) ≤ q(Γ(p,F0)) (A.6)
for all p ∈ Pm(i). Since Γ is decreasing on D, q must be increasing. By Proposition 1,
0 ≤ Γ(p,F00) ≤ ˜ s for all F00 ∈ D, so we require q to be increasing on [0, ˜ s].
To prove strictly increasing diﬀerences, let F > F0 in D. We must now show that
(A.5) is strictly increasing on Pm(i), which requires (A.6) to be strict. Since F > F0, there
exists 0 ≤ p0 < p such that F(p0) < F0(p0). This holds on an open neighborhood to the
right of p0 because F and F0 are everywhere right-continuous. Since x > 0 on that open
neighborhood, we have Γ(p,F) < Γ(p,F0), so it is suﬃcient that q be strictly increasing
on [0, ˜ s].
The following result is similar to lemma 6.1 in Vives (1990, p. 315). A lattice X is
conditionally complete if supS and inf S exist in X for all nonempty and bounded S ⊆ X.
For example, R is conditionally complete.
Formally, we identify strategy proﬁles which are equal almost everywhere with respect
to Lebesgue measure, so P is the space of all equivalence classes of such proﬁles.
Theorem A. P is a complete lattice.
Proof. Clearly, P is a lattice. Let S ⊆ P be nonempty. Welland (1964, p. 267-8)
shows that the space L1 of equivalence classes of Lebesgue integrable functions I → R is
conditionally complete. Each f ∈ P is bounded and measurable, so S ⊆ L1. Recall that
an increasing real-valued function on a compact interval is bounded and a.e. diﬀerentiable,
21hence Riemann and Lebesgue integrable [Haaser and Sullivan (1991, theorem 3.7, p. 228)].
A composition of measurable functions is measurable, so pM(m(i)) is bounded, measurable,
and integrable on I. Since S is bounded from above by pM ◦ m ∈ L1 and from below by
m ∈ L1 and L1 is conditionally complete, it follows that supS and inf S exist in L1. Since
m ≤ inf S ≤ supS ≤ pM ◦ m, we have inf S,supS ∈ P and we are done.
Proof of Proposition 5
Fix i ∈ I. Each f ∈ P induces an F ∈ D. For all F ∈ D, π is continuous and trivially log-
supermodular or supermodular on Pm(i). By theorem 2.4 and its corollary in Vives (1999,
p. 30), φ(i,f) is nonempty and compact, with largest φ(i,f) and smallest φ(i,f) elements.
Now ﬁx f ∈ P and the Ff ∈ D it induces. By the Measurable Maximum Theorem in
Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 570), the best response correspondence φ is measurable
on I. Applying the Measurable Maximum Theorem again, with p as the objective function
and φ as the constraint correspondence, we see that φ is measurable on I. A similar
argument with −p as the objective function shows that φ is measurable on I. The fact
that the extremal best responses are increasing on P follows from f ≥ f0 ⇒ Ff ≥ Ff0,
increasing diﬀerences on Pm(i) × D, and theorem 2.4 and its corollary in Vives (1999, p.
30), which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
According to Proposition 6, φ(i,f) is measurable on I and the map Ψ : P → P deﬁned by
f 7→ φ(i,f) is increasing. We can therefore apply the Tarski ﬁxed point theorem [theorem
2.2 in Vives (1999, p. 20)] to obtain the largest ﬁxed point f of Ψ satisfying
f = sup{f ∈ P |Ψ(f) ≥ f}. (A.7)
Let f be any Nash equilibrium. Since φ(i,f) ≥ f(i) for all i ∈ I, it follows that Ψ(f) ≥ f
and hence f ≥ f. The proofs for f are similar.
22Proof of Lemma 1
It is obvious that Fp and FpM(c) are equilibria in their respective cases. To prove (ii), let
c ≤ p0 < pM(c). We ﬁrst derive the expression for the right-hand derivative of π at p0. By
Proposition 2, N is decreasing on P for all F ∈ D, so it is everywhere diﬀerentiable from
the right. For  > 0 suﬃciently small, p0 < p0 +  < pM(c) ≤ p and















x(p)dp < s (A.9)
for  > 0 suﬃciently small. In (A.8), the numerator and denominator → 0 as  → 0, so we
apply L’Hospital’s Rule to get
lim
→0









x(p0 + ). (A.10)
In diﬀerentiating the numerator, we used the assumption that q is continuous on (0,s) and








x(p0 + ) = q(0+)x(p0). (A.11)
We now take the right-hand derivative of π at p0 to get
−πMq(0+)x(p0) + N(p0,Fp0)πM
p . (A.12)
Since consumers are evenly spread across ﬁrms, N(p0,Fp0) = 1. The expression in (A.12)
is therefore positive if
−πMq(0+)x(p0) + πM
p > 0. (A.13)
We have πM
p (p0,c) > 0 since c ≤ p0 < pM(c). If p0 = c, then πM = 0 and (A.13) holds. If
c < p0 < pM(c), (A.13) boils down to (24). Hence, almost all ﬁrms prefer to raise price.
The proof for (i) is similar but easier.
23Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose Fp0 is an equilibrium cdf of prices for some p0 ∈ P. We must therefore have
p0 ∈ [m(i),pM(m(i))] for almost all i. Take any i ∈ IR. Since I0 has positive measure,
we must have pM(m(i)) < m(i0) ≤ p0 for almost all i ∈ I0, so i cannot be making a best
response. Since IR has positive measure, we are done.
A correspondence φ from a partially ordered set X into a lattice Y is strongly increasing
if x > x0 implies y ≥ y0 for all y ∈ φ(x) and y0 ∈ φ(x0). In other words, a correspondence
is strongly increasing iﬀ all its selections are increasing.
Proof of Theorem 3
We ﬁrst prove (ii). Let f0 ∈ P+. If ﬁrms always choose their largest best response,
we have a best response orbit {fn}∞
n=0 deﬁned by fn+1 = Ψ(fn) (where f0 = f0). By
deﬁnition, f1 = Ψ(f0) ≤ f0. Since Ψ is increasing, fn+1 ≤ fn for all n ≥ 0. If ﬁrms
always choose their smallest best response, {f




1 = Ψ(f0) ≤ Ψ(f0) ≤ f0 and Ψ is also increasing, f
n+1 ≤ f
n for all n ≥ 0. Now take
any best response orbit {fn} ⊆ P with initial condition f0. Since f1(i) ∈ φ(i,f0) for all
i, f1 ≤ Ψ(f0) ≤ f0. Let Fn be the cdf induced by fn for all n ≥ 0. If f1 = f0 for almost
all i, then F1 = F0 and f2 = f1 by hypothesis. Otherwise, F1 < F0 and by hypothesis π
has strictly increasing diﬀerences on Pi × D for all i. By theorem 2.3(iv) in Vives (1999,
p. 26), ﬁrms’ best response correspondences are strongly increasing on D. Hence, f2 ≤ f1
and fn+1 ≤ fn for all n ≥ 0 follows by induction. The best response orbit is therefore
decreasing in all cases.
Let {fn} be any decreasing best response orbit. By the monotone convergence theorem
[Lang (1993, Theorem 5.5, p. 139)], there exists an integrable f : I → R such that
fn(i) → f(i) almost everywhere on I. Since m(i) ≤ fn(i) ≤ pM(m(i)) for all i and n ≥ 0,
the same holds for f almost everywhere. By Egoroﬀ’s theorem [Folland (1999, p. 62], the
convergence fn → f is almost uniform. Let E denote the set of search market equilibria.
We now show that f ∈ E, once we have ﬁxed it on a set of measure zero. First, ﬁx any
i ∈ I in the subset of I of full measure such that fn(i) → f(i). Let D be endowed with the
24topology of weak convergence. According to Dudley (2002, p. 288, 292, 295), Fn → Ff
weakly, where Ff is the cdf induced by f. Furthermore, π is continuous on Pi × D by
Proposition 3 in Rauh (2006). Since fn(i) → f(i), Fn → Ff, and fn(i) ∈ φ(i,fn−1) for all
n ≥ 1, we have f(i) ∈ φ(i,f) because π is continuous. We are then free to alter f for the
other ﬁrms (who comprise a set of measure zero) so that they are making best responses
against f. After doing so, f is a Nash equilibrium. The proof for f ∈ P− is similar.
We now prove (i). Let {fn} be deﬁned as before, starting from f0 = pM ◦ m and
{f
n} starting from f
0 = m. Clearly, f0 ∈ P+ and f
0 ∈ P−. From (ii), there exists
f ∈ E (f ∈ E) such that fn ↓ f (f
n ↑ f) and convergence is also pointwise almost
everywhere. We now show that f is the largest search market equilibrium, recalling that
we identify functions which diﬀer at most on a set of measure zero. Fix any f ∈ E. Clearly,
f0 = pM ◦ m ≥ f. Moreover, fn ≥ f implies
fn+1 = Ψ(fn) ≥ Ψ(f) ≥ f, (A.14)
so fn ≥ f for all n ≥ 0. It follows that f ≥ f almost everywhere, so we are done. A
similar argument shows that f is the smallest search market equilibrium. Now take any
best response orbit {fn} with initial condition f0. Clearly, f
0 ≤ f0 ≤ f0. Furthermore,
f
1 = Ψ(f
0) ≤ Ψ(f0) ≤ f1 ≤ Ψ(f0) ≤ Ψ(f0) = f1. (A.15)
By induction, f
n ≤ fn ≤ fn, so we are done.
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